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Since Vladimir Putin first became President 
of Russia in May 2000, the role of the Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC) in society and its ties 
to the Russian government have grown. The 
Church has demonstrated its increased influ-
ence by supporting changes in Russia’s public 
policies, which now contradict the constitution-
al promise of secularism in Russia. The purpose 
of this paper is to discuss several examples of 
these changes and to show how the social mis-
sion of the ROC has influenced Russia’s foreign 
and domestic policy in recent years. 
The organization of the Church today differs 
somewhat from its historical configuration, as 
well as from those of non-Eastern Orthodox 
churches generally. The ROC is one of fifteen 
autocephalous hierarchical Orthodox churches, 
which together make up the churches of Eastern 
Orthodoxy. Unlike in Roman Catholicism, there 
is no single earthly head of Eastern Orthodoxy. 
The Eastern Orthodox churches are, however, in 
full communion with one another, meaning that 
priests from any of the churches are allowed to 
minister to members of any of the other church-
es. Rather than maintaining an Eastern Ortho-
dox papacy, each individual church has its own 
primate, the head of the ROC being the Patri-
arch of Moscow and all Rus’. The current charter 
of the ROC accords the Patriarch a number of 
duties and grants him executive authority over 
the Russian Church. Among his responsibilities 
are upholding the unity of the Church’s hierar-
chy, representing the ROC in its relations with 
state authorities, issuing decrees on the election 
and appointment of diocesan bishops, and over-
seeing the maintenance and acquisition of the 
Church’s property. Once attained, the rank of 
Patriarch is held for life. 
 If we look back at the original promise 
of secularity in the Russian Constitution, we can 
see how it is contradicted by the current state of 
affairs. Article 14 of Chapter 1 of the First Sec-
tion of the Constitution of the Russian Federa-
tion, which was adopted by national referendum 
on December 12, 1993 states, “1. The Russian 
Federation shall be a secular state. No religion 
may be established as the State religion or as 
obligatory. 2. Religious associations shall be sep-
arate from the State and shall be equal before the 
law.”  Despite this decree, the Russian state and 
the ROC have already formed a unique partner-
ship that continues to have a substantial impact 
on public policy in the Russian Federation today.
 Before the establishment of the Russian 
Federation in 1993, no government in the histo-
ry of the Russian nation had claimed to represent 
a secular state. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution 
of 1917, which brought into power an officially 
atheistic Soviet Union, the state religion of the 
Russian Empire was Russian Orthodox Chris-
tianity. The Tsar of Russia was the official head 
of the Church, and held the title of Supreme 
Defender of the Church. Before the Soviet gov-
ernment took possession of church buildings 
in Russia, various groups and individuals had 
owned them. The ROC owned some, but cer-
tainly not all. The Tsar’s court owned some. Lo-
cal institutions owned others, and private estate 
holders owned some as well. In the 1990s, Or-
thodox communities sprang up around historic 
church buildings, and the ROC demanded (and 
received) control of nearly all of those buildings. 
Since 2000, that property has increasingly been 
redistributed in favor of high-ranking members 
of the clergy.  This change is one small example 
of many that illustrates the growing power of 
ROC leaders in Russian society since the found-
ing of the new Russian Federation.
 The ROC has grown in membership over 
the last couple of decades as well. According to 
Interfax, the percentage of Russians going to 
church has increased over the last 16 years from 
57% to 71%.  The change indicates that a growing 
number identify with the Church in some way. 
This interpretation is supported by other recent 
polls. When asked what role the Church plays 
in the country’s life, 73% of Russian respondents 
said they were sure that the ROC plays a posi-
tive role, and only 2% disagreed with them. In 
the same survey, 64% said they trust the Rus-
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sian Church and 56% said they trust Patriarch 
Kirill. Of the respondents, 68% identified them-
selves as Russian Orthodox Christians.  Clearly, 
an increasing segment of the Russian populace 
supports the ROC. As could be expected, this 
influence has translated to increased economic 
support for the ROC over that time as well. The 
Church today has an elite support system that 
is powerful in multiple sectors of society. Im-
portant bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and mem-
bers of the intelligentsia favor public financing 
and development of the ROC for reasons of cul-
tural identity, despite the fact that many are not 
churchgoers themselves. 
 The current state/church arrangement 
can be described as follows: in exchange for cer-
tain benefits from the state, including increased 
policy influence and economic opportunities, the 
government of the Russian Federation receives 
the legitimacy that ROC approval provides. 
Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Rhode Island and former US State Department 
special assistant for policy on the Soviet Union 
Nicolai Petro explains the situation like this:
 The ROC’s increased influence can 
be seen in Russia’s foreign policy. It may seem 
strange, but the ROC now has a significant role 
in Russia’s national security strategy. Although 
much of the recent literature analyzing Russian 
foreign policy has neglected to discuss state/
church collaboration, Patriarch Kirill and the 
ROC now play a role in both formulating and 
advancing Russian interests abroad.  The ROC’s 
work with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs (MOFA) began in 2003 when then-Patri-
arch Alexey II officially visited Russia’s MOFA 
for the first time.  During that meeting, the ROC 
and MOFA agreed to build a working relation-
ship through a group dedicated to defending the 
ROC’s activity abroad and forming policies that 
would “deepen Russia’s ‘spiritual’ values.”  As 
Foreign Minister Lavrov put it, the new group 
would enable the Church and Foreign Ministry 
to work “together realizing a whole array of for-
eign policy and international activity thrusts.” 
 Resulting from this collaboration, the 
notion of “spiritual values” and the need for 
“spiritual restoration” have become frequent rhe-
torical refrains in the MOFA’s strategic planning 
documents. For example, Russia’s 2003 National 
Security Concept emphasized “spiritual resto-
ration” as essential for combating the “negative 
influence” of foreign religious organizations (in-
cluding those that had already been working in 
Russia for decades).  Although the term “spiritu-
ality” seems generic, the objective of the policy 
is clearly the restoration of Russian Orthodoxy 
to a de facto state religion. At the same time, the 
policy is designed so as to hinder the work of 
foreign-based religious organizations in Russia, 
which the ROC has referred to as threats to “the 
integrity of [Russia’s] national consciousness and 
cultural identity… and the spiritual and moral 
ideal that is common to all of us.”  This policy ex-
panded under the leadership of President Med-
vedev and has continued into President Putin’s 
third term. 
 Other examples show how Russia’s con-
stitutional promise of secularism has been un-
dermined since Putin’s ascension to power. For 
example, one may note that President Putin and 
the Church hierarchy spend quite a lot of time 
together in public. Putin is frequently followed 
by Church hierarchs (in full religious garb) at 
undeniably political events, and is shown by 
state media attending Church services on every 
religious holiday.  No other religious organiza-
“For the time being, the Russian Orthodox Church 
and the Russian government are in a marriage of con-
venience. The Russian Orthodox Church is given free 
rein to try to change social mores through public in-
stitutions like the media, films, the military, and the 
educational curriculum. In return, the government 
gets the support of what President Medvedev in Feb-
ruary 2011 called ‘the largest and most authoritative 
social institution in contemporary Russia.’”
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tion has its services broadcast on national televi-
sion. In addition, Orthodox chapels can now be 
found in railroad stations and airports, with mil-
itary units, and in police departments. It is also 
now common for Orthodox priests to sanctify 
banks, offices, homes, vehicles like tanks, ships 
and airplanes, and even military weapons. An 
ROC-endorsed course on “Orthodox Culture” is 
now offered in many public secondary schools 
even though similar courses are not taught for 
other religions. 
 The ROC advocated public school teach-
ing of the Orthodox Culture course, referred to 
as “Foundations of the Orthodox Culture”, for 
several years before its introduction under Pres-
ident Medvedev in 2007. But the ROC’s mission 
for public education in Russia is much greater. 
According to the contemporary Church’s most 
comprehensive publication regarding its social 
mission, the Bases of the Social Concept, “It 
is desirable that the entire educational system 
should be built on religious principles and based 
on Christian values.”  Considering the Church’s 
stated mission in regards to education, it is quite 
reasonable to expect that Church leaders will 
affect other novel changes in the Russian public 
education system over the coming years. We can 
expect to see additional ROC-inspired changes 
in Russian military policy as well.
 The example of sanctifying state-owned 
weapons is quite interesting. Since 2000 there 
have been numerous reports of the Russian mil-
itary utilizing the services of ROC clergy in this 
manner. It is now not unusual for ROC priests to 
bless the President’s nuclear launch code brief-
case and to sprinkle holy water on S-400 Triumph 
surface-to-air missile systems in ceremonies that 
are then broadcast on national television.  This 
is particularly striking because officially the 
Church objects to “consecrate[ing] places that 
can serve a ‘double purpose’ and establishments 
directly or indirectly encouraging sin.”  Despite 
this objection, not a single high-ranking ROC 
priest has ever complained about the practice of 
sanctifying weapons of mass destruction. 
 These are not the only examples of ROC 
incursion into an ostensibly secular Russian mil-
itary. In 2009, President Medvedev announced 
that the government would support chaplains 
representing Russia’s “traditional faiths” (in-
cluding Islam, Judaism and Buddhism, in addi-
tion to Orthodoxy) while they provide religious 
services to members of Russia’s armed forces. 
While such a plan might seem non-discrim-
inatory (putting aside for a moment the fact 
that representatives of “non-traditional” faiths, 
including protestant Christian denominations, 
would not be accommodated), in reality the mil-
itary was well prepared to reject the admission 
of non-ROC chaplains, and it has done so by in-
cluding a rule in the chaplaincy program that re-
quires “adherents of a ‘traditional’ religious faith 
to account for [a minimum of] ten percent of a 
military unit before the state will authorize an 
official chaplain.”  Although many members of 
Russia’s armed forces are not Orthodox Chris-
tians, very few military units are made up of 
more than ten percent adherents of one of the 
other three “traditional” religious groups. As a 
result, the military hired nearly one thousand 
full-time, paid ROC priests, but only two Mus-
lim chaplains and one Buddhist chaplain as of 
October 4, 2013.  For years Patriarch Kirill has 
advocated including Orthodox priests (to the 
exclusion of other clergy) in Russia’s military, so 
it is not surprising that he quickly praised Presi-
dent Medvedev’s plan, which is still in effect to-
day under President Putin. 
 The ROC has also vocally supported 
President Putin and the Russian Duma while 
they place greater restrictions on the freedom 
of expression in Russia. The recent case of the 
punk rock protest group Pussy Riot, and the 
change in policy resulting from it, illustrates the 
ROC’s attitude towards speech that is critical 
of the Church’s politics. On February 21, 2012, 
"Russian Orthodox Church, Petropavlovsk" 
Austronesian Expeditions
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five members of the protest group entered the 
Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow and 
staged a performance on the altar, in which they 
appealed to the Virgin Mary to “chase Putin 
away.”  Both regime officials and ROC leaders 
were indignant following the group’s short but 
unexpected concert in the cathedral. Foreign 
Minister Lavrov called it “blasphemy”. Patriarch 
Kirill said the group had made a “mockery of a 
sacred place”. Others referred to the Pussy Riot 
members as “prostitutes” and “satanic devils” 
and called for them to be ripped to pieces on the 
ancient execution site at Red Square. 
 Most Russian critics at the time failed 
to notice that the “punk-prayer” was not direct-
ed against Orthodoxy in general, but specifi-
cally against the political role of the Orthodox 
Church and its support for the Putin/Medvedev 
regime. Several members of the band were put 
on trial for the crime of “hooliganism motivated 
by religious hatred,” which carries a maximum 
sentence of seven years. On August 17, 2012, 
three of the group’s most prominent members, 
including Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Ma-
ria Alyokhina were convicted and sentenced 
to two years imprisonment.  Amnesty Interna-
tional recognized the protesters as prisoners of 
conscience,  while the Union of Solidarity with 
Political Prisoners recognized them as political 
prisoners.  No ROC leader has publically asked 
for leniency or forgiveness on the part of the re-
gime. Instead, Patriarch Kirill called on the gov-
ernment to criminalize blasphemy, which it did 
on June 11, 2013.  It is now a federal crime in 
Russia to conduct public actions that insult the 
feelings of religious believers, and the new crim-
inal offense comes with a punishment of up to 
three years in prison. 
 One of the complaints that the mem-
bers of Pussy Riot cite as a motivation for their 
performances is Church-supported government 
policy that discriminates against sexual minori-
ties. This final example of the ROC’s increased 
influence in public policy is the one that has 
gained the most international attention lately. In 
June 2013, President Putin signed into law a ban 
on “propaganda of non-traditional sexual rela-
tions.”  In short, the law says that any person who 
is accused of promoting “non-traditional sexual 
relations” is subject to criminal prosecution. As 
a result of this law, anybody (including lawyers, 
judges, and politicians) who argues in support of 
gay equality can be fined. 
 Several international organizations have 
protested the law, and numerous public figures 
have criticized it.  International boycotts have 
been called against Russian vodka producers as 
well as against the Winter Olympics in Sochi. 
Patriarch Kirill, on the other hand, support-
ed the bill in parliament and praised President 
Putin for signing it into law, adding, “we must 
do everything in our power to ensure that sin is 
never sanctioned in Russia by state law, because 
that would mean that the nation has embarked 
on a path of self-destruction.”  Although support 
for the law is by no means limited to the Church 
or its members, the Church’s strong promotion 
of the law and years of actively supporting such 
legislation has often been overlooked by both 
Russian and international critics.
 An understanding of the Church’s in-
creased influence in Russia, especially since 
President Putin’s first inauguration in 2000, is 
essential for understanding recent changes in 
public policy and for predicting future devel-
opments in Russian society. All of the policy 
changes discussed here show that the Russian 
government and the ROC are working togeth-
er to undermine secularism in Russia. Despite 
Russia’s constitutional guarantee of separation of 
church and state, it seems that the regime and 
the ROC have found it in their interests to put an 
end to a very brief period of Russian secularism. 
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